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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Respondent, Regdab, Inc. doing business as Badger Building Center (hereinafter
“Badger”), operates as a supplier of construction materials and equipment. Badger initiated this
lawsuit to collect for materials supplied to various projects, including the property owned by the
Appellants, Buck and Laurie Graybill (hereinafter “Graybills”), pursuant to a to Idaho’s
Materialmen’s Lien Law, Title 45, Chapter 5 of the Idaho Code that Badger recorded against the
Graybills’ property.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Badger specified in its complaint that it sought its attorneys fees and costs incurred in this
litigation according to the mechanic’s lien statute of Idaho Code § 45-513.

The Graybills

appeared through counsel in the lawsuit. They then allowed an order of default to be entered by
the District Court. When Badger sought to enter a default judgment against the Graybills’
property pursuant to mechanic’s lien, the Graybills vehemently opposed and defended against a
judgment. The Graybills argued at length that Badger was not entitled to any award of attorneys
fees and costs because the prayer for relief in the complaint did not specify the dollar amount of
attorneys fees that would be awarded if a default judgment was entered pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(e)(4). The Graybills argued strenuously against Badger’s subsequent motion for leave to
amend the complaint to address their technical defense to an award of attorneys fees. The
Graybills similarly filed repeated motions and detailed memoranda arguing against any judgment
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being entered, or allowing any award of attorneys fees and costs to Badger. The District Court
ultimately concluded that language of the mechanic’s lien statute, Idaho Code § 45-513,
mandated an award of attorneys fees, and thus the conflicting language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) was
not applicable pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). The District Court ultimately entered a default
judgment which included an award of attorneys fees and costs to Badger.
C.

Statement of the Facts.

Between September 2, 2016 and October 5, 2016, Badger furnished $10,103.22 worth of
building materials to Borges, LLC from Badger’s Sagle, Idaho facility. Borges, LLC used these
materials for the improvement of four different residential construction projects in Bonner
County, Idaho. Badger furnished building materials to Borges, LLC in the principal amount of
$5,252.99 for the improvement of the Graybill’s property located at 240 Hanford Drive, Sagle,
Idaho 83860. (R. Vol. I, p. 65-66).
Borges, LLC had executed a Commercial Account Application with Badger, that
included a Personal Guaranty executed its owner, Chris Borges. (R. Vol. I, p. 65). Borges, LLC
failed to pay for the supplies purchased from Badger, despite its requests. (R. Vol. I, p. 67).
On November 10, 2016, Badger recorded a mechanic’s lien on the Graybills’ property to
secure payment for the materials supplied to the Graybills’ property. (R. Vol. I, p. 67). Badger
likewise filed mechanic’s liens on three other properties for which Borges used the materials
purchased from Badger. (R. Vol. I, p. 67-68).
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Two of the other property owners subsequently made payments to resolve the remaining
debts owed on the mechanic’s liens Badger had recorded against their properties, and Badger
released the mechanic’s liens from the title of those properties.

(R. Vol. I, p. 67-68).

Badger was unable to resolve the mechanic’s lien dispute with the remaining two
property owners, the Graybills and Patrick Ferrick. On April 19, 2017, Badger filed the lawsuit
for this case against Borges, LLC, and its owners individually, and against the Graybills and Mr.
Ferrick and his wife to foreclose on Badger’s mechanic’s liens. (R. Vol. I, p. 9).
Borges, LLC and its owners failed to appear and defend in the case. On June 2, 2017, the
District Court entered a default judgment against Borges, LLC and its owners. (R. Vol. I, p. 4860).

Badger subsequently resolved the matter with Mr. Ferrick, and the Court entered a

stipulated order of dismissal for Mr. Ferrick, his wife, as well as its lenders that held a deed of
trust on his property. (R. Vol. II, p. 238-240).
The Graybills appeared through its counsel on June 8, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 61). Badger
filed a Motion for Default against the Graybills on July 27, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 114). The
District Court entered an Order of Default against the Graybills on July 28, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p.
122-23). The District Court scheduled a case scheduling conference for August 23, 2017. (R.
Vol. I, p. 9).
On August 15, 2017, Badger filed its Motion for Default Judgment against the Graybills
and their property, and scheduled the hearing to take place on the same day as the scheduling
conference, August 23, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 9, 125). On August 21, 2017, the Graybills filed a
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detailed Motion to Disallow the Plaintiff’s Motion, Affidavit, and Proposed Default. (R. Vol. I,
p. 196-201). The Graybills defended against the substantive and procedural issues in the case,
and made numerous arguments as to why default judgment should not be entered.

The

Graybills’ Motion included an argument that there was no specific dollar amount pled by Badger
in its complaint for the amount of attorneys fees that would be sought in the event of a default
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4).
Upon receiving Graybills’ extensive Motion, Badger voluntarily struck the hearing for
the Default Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 9). The parties proceeded to have the scheduling conference
on August 23, 2017, which the Graybills’ attorney attended. (R. Vol. I, p. 10).

The Court

scheduled a trial to take place in March 27, 2018. (R. Vol. I, p. 10).
Badger then filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint on September 6, 2017, to address
the Graybills’ litany of objections to the form of Badger’s Complaint. (R. Vol. II, p. 202-37).
The hearing date for the Motion to Amend was September 20, 2017. (R. Vol. II, p. 202-04).
Badger filed a detailed Memorandum and proposed Amended Complaint. (R. Vol. II, p. 20837).

Badger’s proposed Amended Complaint included a specific dollar amount for attorneys

fees in the event a default judgment is entered in order to address the Graybills’ argument that a
dollar amount needed to be specified in the complaint in the event a default judgment was
entered pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4). (R. Vol. II, p. 232). It further dealt with and addressed a
number of other arguments made by the Graybills.
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The Graybills’ counsel appeared at this hearing on September 20, 2017, and again argued
at length against Badger’s Motion to Amend. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 36-43). The Graybills’ counsel
argued that the Graybills had filed a Notice of Tender of Funds on August 21, 2017, and that
somehow that precluded an award of attorneys fees, and somehow constituted res judicata. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 38, L. 8-25, p. 39, L. 1-7, R. Vol. I, p. 9). The Graybills continued to argue about
whether it was a personal judgment versus a judgment against the Graybill’s property. (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 39, L. 8-10). They argued at length against the amendment of the complaint because there
had been an order of default, and that it cannot be amended after an order of default is entered.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 1-11). This is despite the fact that Badger agreed to stipulate to vacating the
order of default if that was the obstacle. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 44, L. 11-25). The Graybills continued
argue at length that there could not be an award of attorneys fees since there was a precise dollar
figure specified in the complaint. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 12-25, p. 38, L. 1-25).
During the September 20, 2017, the District Court denied the Badger’s Motion to Amend
the Complaint. The District Court reasoned that there was no need to amend the complaint to
specify a dollar figure in the event of a default, because the complaint specified that Badger was
seeking an award of attorneys fees and costs for having to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien
against the Graybill’s property. The District Court reasoned that the Graybills had notice that
attorneys fees would be sought as part of the judgment. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 42, L. 22-25, p. 43, L. 114). Since the Graybills had notice that Badger would be seeking its attorneys fees and costs, it
would serve no basis to amend the complaint to specify a dollar amount as it would just require
unnecessary additional attorneys fees. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45, L. 22-25, p. 46, L. 1-13).
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On September 21, 2017, the Graybills filed a detailed pleading entitled “Graybills’
Memorandum On Issue of An Award of Attorney Fees On Plaintiff’s Motion for a Default
Judgment.” (R. Vol. II, p. 241-45). The Graybills again argued at length the objections raised
during the hearing about how Badger no longer had a mechanic’s lien because the Graybills had
“paid” the debt owed by the mechanic’s lien through an attempted tender of funds that Badger
returned to the Grabyills. (R. Vol. II, p. 242). The Graybills argued at length about their defense
to an award of attorneys fees since they argued that Badger needed to specify a dollar amount in
the prayer for relief in the event of a default pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4). (R. Vol. II, p. 24245).
On September 29, 2017, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in
which the District Court denied Badger’s Motion to Amend the Complaint, and Denied
Graybills’ Motion to Disallow an award of attorneys fees and costs to Badger. (R. Vol. II, p.
246-59). Although the Graybills do not cite to the record in their Brief, this is the order in which
the District Court provides the rationale for awarding Badger its attorneys fees and costs
pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-513.

The District Court directed Badger to file a motion for

default judgment, and to schedule it for a hearing. The documentation to be included in the
default judgment motion included “a Memorandum of Costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4)), an Affidavit of
Attorney’s Fees (I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), (5)), and an Affidavit of Amount Due (I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).”
(R. Vol. II, p. 259).

6

On October 3, 2017, Badger filed its Motion for Default Judgment pleadings, including
an affidavit for attorneys fees and the Memorandum of Costs. (R. Vol. II, p. 261-360). The
hearing for the Motion for Default Judgment was scheduled to take place on October 18, 2017.
On October 16, 2017, the Graybills again filed a detailed pleading entitled “Graybills’ Objection
and Motion to Disallow Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Default Judgment.” (R. Vol. II, p. 361386). In this lengthy Memorandum, the Graybills’ continued to defend against any award of
attorneys fees, and argued at length regarding the District Court’s analysis in the September 29,
2017 Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. Vol. II, p. 361-386).
On October 23, 2017, the District Court granted Badger’s Motion for Default Judgment
and entered an Order for the Sale of the Graybills’ Property. In the Order, the Court awarded
Graybill $7,160.00 in attorneys fees and $974.62 in costs, for a total amount of $8,134.62. (R.
Vol. III, p. 418). This is in addition to the principal amount owed of $5,252.99 plus prejudgment
interest. The District Court awarded Badger the total judgment amount of $13,941.45. (R. Vol.
III, p. 419-20). The District Court entered the Default Judgment for that amount on October 23,
2017. (R. Vol. III, p. 405-07). The District Court further entered an order on October 23, 2017,
denying the Graybills’ Motion to Disallow Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Default Judgment. (R.
Vol. III, p. 422-24).
Pursuant to the Court’s Order for the Sale of the Graybills’ Property, the Sheriff
scheduled a sale to take place on December 19, 2017. (R. Vol. III, p. 431). On December 4,
2017, the Graybills filed their Notice of Appeal in this case. (R. Vol. III, p. 425). On December
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14, 2017, the District Court entered an Order for the Stay of Execution Pending the Appeal, and
the Graybills deposited the funds to the Court. (R. Vol. III, p. 430-32).
II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Should the Court affirm the District Court’s judgment awarding attorneys fees and costs
to Badger because the Graybills appeared and actively defended the case before the
default judgment was eventually entered by the District Court.

2.

Should the Court affirm the District Court’s judgment awarding attorneys fees and costs
to Badger because the Graybills’ technical defense could have been addressed by the
District Court granting Badger’s Motion to Amend the Complaint.

3.

Is Badger entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-121 because the Graybills have filed this appeal unreasonably and without
foundation.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Appropriately Awarded Badger Its Attorneys Fees Pursuant to I.C.
45-513.
The District Court correctly found that the language of Idaho Code § 45-513 mandated an

award of attorneys fees, which is directly contrary to the language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) pertaining
to awards of attorneys fees for default judgments. The District Court correctly concluded that
since the mandatory language in Idaho Code § 45-513 was inconsistent language of I.R.C.P.
54(e)(4), that language of the statute controlled pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8), and warranted an
award of attorneys fees and costs to Badger.
The Graybills have appealed the District Court’s order awarding attorneys fees and costs
arguing:
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Regdab did no plead any amount but the District Court awarded default fees
anyway because if found that Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure § 54(e)(4)(B) was
inconsistent with Idaho Code § 45-513 so Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure § 54(e)
did not apply. This is an error because Idaho Code § 45-513 does not provide any
means to calculate a reasonable fee so it is not inconsistent with Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure § 54(e).
(App. Brief pg. 2).

The Graybills’ argument is wrong for several reasons. First, Badger did

plead in the prayer for relief of the complaint that Badger be awarded its reasonable attorneys
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-513. (R. Vol. I, p. 74). As will be addressed in the
next section of this brief, that is sufficient when a defendant appears and actively defends in the
lawsuit before a default judgment is ultimately entered.
Second, the District Court did not conclude that I.R.C.P. 54(e) in its entirety was
inapplicable. The District Court only concluded that the subpart I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) (B) did not
apply because it directly contradicted the mandatory language of the Idaho Code § 45-513. The
case law that the District Court relied upon continued to use the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) for
ruling upon the reasonable attorneys fees and costs. In the District Court’s Memorandum
Decision and Order, the District Court directed Badger to prepare an affidavit of attorneys fees
utilizing the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) prior to entering the default judgment. (R. Vol. II, p.
259). Badger did prepare an affidavit according to the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3),
which the District Court used to base the award of attorneys fees and costs. (R. Vol. II, p. 265).
Third, the case law that the Graybills rely upon is not applicable because it dealt with the
narrow issue of whether the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) should apply to an award of attorneys
fees pursuant to a statute. The application of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is not disputed in this case. The
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case law did not deal with the conflicting provisions of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) to a statute, and thus it
is inapplicable.
The District Court correctly looked to the holding of Olsen v. Rowe, 125 Idaho 686, 873
P.2d 1340 (Ct. App. 1994), for guidance on the issue. (R. Vol. II, p. 251- 54).

The Court in

Olsen explained that the language in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) uses the permissive language which
requires the finding of a prevailing party within the discretion of the district court.

The

mechanic’s lien statute, Idaho Code § 45-513, includes mandatory language requiring the court
to award attorneys fees to a successful lien claimant. Thus the court concluded that I.R.C.P.
54(e)(1) does not apply because it was inconsistent with the statutory language and thus did not
apply pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8).

Olsen v. Rowe, 125 Idaho at 688–89. The court, however,

did continue to find that the reasonableness of the attorneys fees would be awarded pursuant to
the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Olsen, 125 Idaho at 689.
The court in Olsen emphasized the mandatory language of the lien statute, and the case
laws that has consistently held that attorneys fees must be awarded to the lien claimant.
Idaho Code § 45–513, on the other hand, states, “The court shall also allow as
part of the costs the moneys paid for filing and recording the claim [of lien], and
reasonable attorney's fees.” (Emphasis added.) This provision has been interpreted
to mean that the costs of filing and recording, as well as the attorney fees, are
incidental to the foreclosure of the lien. Therefore, the lien is also enforceable as
to the costs and fees. See Smith v. Faris–Kesl Constr. Co., Ltd., 27 Idaho 407,
423, 150 P. 25, 30 (1915) (attorney's fee is merged with and becomes a part of the
principal debt for which foreclosure of the lien is sought); see also Barber v.
Honorof, 116 Idaho 767, 771, 780 P.2d 89, 93 (1989); J.E.T. Development v.
Dorsey Construction Co., 102 Idaho 863, 865, 642 P.2d 954, 957 (Ct.App.1982).
Our Supreme Court has indicated that the statutory right to attorney fees under
I.C. § 45–513 upon lien foreclosure applies even where the defendant property
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owner has been successful on a counterclaim, so long as the counterclaim did not
totally offset the amount of the lien. Dawson v. Eldredge, 89 Idaho 402, 409, 405
P.2d 754, 761 (1965).
Olsen v. Rowe, 125 Idaho at 688; see also Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho 72, 78, 982 P.2d 375,
381 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (noting that an award of attorney fees and costs in favor of successful
lien claimant is mandatory, but that the amount of attorney fees is left to the court's discretion).
The Court then explained:
Therefore, it appears that I.C. § 45–513 provides for a mandatory award of
attorney fees as part of the enforcement of the lien, while I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1)
requires the finding of a prevailing party within the discretion of the district court.
This apparent conflict, however, is resolved by the language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8).
It states:
The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be
applicable to all claims for attorney fees made pursuant to section
12–121, Idaho Code, and to any claim for attorney fees made
pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any contract, to the
extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for
attorney **1343 *689 fees would not be inconsistent with such
other statute or contract. [Emphasis added.]
To the extent that Rule 54(e) is inconsistent with I.C. § 45–513, we hold that
the rule has no application and does not modify the statute.
Olsen v. Rowe, 125 Idaho at 688–89(emphasis added). The court, however, did continue to find
that the reasonableness of the attorneys fees would be awarded pursuant to the factors set forth in
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Olsen, 125 Idaho at 689.
The holding of Olsen v. Rowe is consistent with the Court’s holding in the case of Zenner
v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009), where the Court concluded I.R.C.P.
54(e) does not apply to an award of attorneys fees pursuant to the language of the parties’
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contract. The Court made the award of actual attorneys fees based upon the language of the
contract. It did not base its award on I.R.C.P. 54(e). The Court concluded that the language of
the contract was inconsistent with the language of I.R.C.P. 54(e), and thus the Rule was
inapplicable pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). The discretionary language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) was
inapplicable, and the factors for what constitutes a reasonable award set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
because it was inconsistent with the plain wording of the contract.

Zenner v. Holcomb, 147

Idaho at 450-51.
The District Court in this case did not go as far as the Court did in Zenner v. Holcomb,
and conclude that entire I.R.C.P. 54(e) was inapplicable because of the conflicting provisions
with subparts I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Rather, the District Court only concluded
that the subpart I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4)(B) did not apply because it directly contradicted the mandatory
language of the Idaho Code § 45-513.
Applying the holding of Olsen v. Rowe and Rule 54(e)(8) to the facts of this case,
this Court finds that Rule 54(e)(4)(B)’s requirement that the amount of attorney’s
fees in the event of default be included in the prayer for relief and that the fee
award not exceed the amount in the prayer to be inconsistent with Idaho Code §
45-513, which mandates the award of certain costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
in lien foreclosure actions. Thus, Rule 54(e)(4)(B) is not applicable to this case.
Accordingly, the Court “shall” allow Regdab “as part of the costs the money paid
for filing and recording the claim, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” I.C. § 45-513.
(R. Vol. II, p. 254). As pointed out by the District Court in the Memorandum Decision, the
language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) has changed since the Olsen v. Rowe decision. (R. Vol. II, p. 253).
The rule now provides:
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Any claim for attorney fees, including claims pursuant to Idaho Code section 12121, must be made pursuant to Rule 54(e) unless an applicable statute or
contract provides otherwise.
(Emphasis added). The change in the wording is broader than the previous rule, and it further
supports the reasoning and holding of Olsen v. Rowe, as well as the District Court’s decision.
The I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) requirements are contrary to the language of the statute Idaho Code. § 45–
513. Thus, the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) requirements have no application to this case, and not modify
the statute, Idaho Code § 45–513.
The District Court directed Badger to prepare an affidavit of attorneys fees utilizing the
factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) prior to entering the default judgment consistent with Olsen v. Rowe
decision.
The documentation in support of the second default judgment must include a
Memorandum of Costs (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4)), an Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees
(I.R.C.P. 54(e) (3), (5)), and an Affidavit of Amount Due (I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).
(R. Vol. II, p. 259)(emphasis added).

Badger complied with the District Court’s order and

prepared an affidavit according to the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). (R. Vol. II, p. 265).
The Graybills primarily rely upon Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 530, 284 P.3d 970,
974 (2012), which did not address the issue at hand. In that case, there was no dispute that the
statute at issue, Idaho Code § 15–3–720, allowed for an award of attorneys fees. The issue was
whether to apply the reasonableness standards set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), when awarding
attorneys fees. The Court concluded that there was nothing inconsistent between the language of
the statute and the measure of the reasonableness of attorneys fees standard set forth in I.R.C.P.
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54(e)(3). Accordingly, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) did not preclude the court from applying the reasonable
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) when making an award. The court in Bailey v. Bailey, did
not addressed the default provisions of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4), and whether that was inconsistent with
the statutory provisions of Idaho Code § 15–3–720. The Court in Bailey did not address a
directly conflicting provision between the statute and court rule such as the case at hand. Thus,
the Graybills’ reliance upon the Bailey case is misplaced.
The District Court’s holding and reasoning makes abundant sense.

It is incredibly

difficult and impractical to forecast the amount of attorneys fees that will be incurred for the lien
foreclosure lawsuit in the event of a default judgment in a case such as the one at hand. In this
case, Badger sued the contractor, Borges, LLC, and the property owners for several projects. It
is unclear at the outset if either the contractor or the owner of the property, or both, will contest
the amount due pursuant to the contract or the mechanic’s lien. If either contests the matter, a
lien foreclosure cannot simply take place by a default judgment. The lien foreclosure process is
a difficult and cumbersome process, and requires the entry of multiple pleadings with the Court.
In addition to a default judgment, there needs to be an order for the sale of the property, a notice
of levy, a writ of execution, a notice of sheriff’s sale which has to be published in the newspaper
for several weeks. In the end, what purpose does it serve to put a forecasted dollar amount in
complaint for the Graybills? They are not going to let the property be sold by a sheriff’s sale.
As in this case, they will use whatever legal maneuvering they can to prevent that from taking
place, including an appeal, and cause Badger to incur substantial attorneys fees and costs
collecting this debt that is clearly owed. Such a burden is directly contrary to the purpose and
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language of the lien statute Idaho Code § 45-513. The restrictive requirements in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(4) set up unnecessary and cumbersome road blocks for companies such as Badger to be
able to seek payment for modest amounts due. The statutory language of Idaho Code § 45-513
and the case law that has interpreted it, have clearly held that lien claimants should be able to
recover the amount they have supplied to construction projects, and not being able to recover the
debt owed because the attorneys fees and costs are more than the debt and unrecoverable. The
Court should affirm the District Court’s ruling and similarly find that the language and process
set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) is contrary to the mandatory language of Idaho Code 45-513, and
thus not required in this case.
B.

The Graybills Appeared and Actively Defended the Lawsuit Before Default
Judgment Was Eventually Entered.
The Graybills’ argument that the District Court’s award of attorneys fees was improper

fails because the Graybills appeared and actively defended the lawsuit before the Court entered
the default judgment. This was issue was dealt with in a similar case of Magleby v. Garn, 154
Idaho 194, 197, 296 P.3d 400, 403 (2013). The Graybills cited to and discussed this case in their
memorandum to the District Court prior to the entry of the default judgment. (R. Vol. II, p. 381).
In Magleby, the defendants appeared and defended thcase. The trial court eventually entered a
default judgment against the defendants in that lawsuit after significant litigation took place and
the defendants actively defended the lawsuit. The Court interpreted the requirements of I.R.C.P.
54(e)(4) for awarding attorneys fees, and concluded that the plaintiff should have been awarded
its reasonable attorneys fees when the defendants actively defended the case.
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There are two situations in which the default attorney fees provision of I.R.C.P.
54(e) (4) may be implicated. The most common situation is when the defendant
does not appear or defend. In that event, a specific dollar figure is required, and
the trial court may not award a greater sum than the plaintiff has specifically
requested. The less common situation is that which is presented by the case before
us. In this situation, the defendant appears and defends, thus forcing the
plaintiff to incur additional attorney fees, but default judgment is eventually
entered. This situation may arise, as in the present case, when an attorney is
permitted to withdraw and no further appearance is forthcoming, see I.R.C.P.
11(b)(3), or default judgment may be entered as a sanction for violation of court
orders, see I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C); 37(e). In those cases in which the defendant
has appeared and defended, only later to be the subject of a default
judgment, at the time the complaint is filed the plaintiff is unable to
meaningfully assign a number to the requested attorney fees to be entered in
the event of default, as the amount of reasonable attorney fees is necessarily
dependent upon future, unknown events, i.e., the extent to which additional
services by plaintiff's counsel are required to respond to the defense of the
lawsuit.
Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho at 197 (emphasis added).
The Court went on to explain that the “district court's decision, limiting the Maglebys to
$2,500, is inconsistent with the purpose of the rule, which is to place a defaulting party on notice
of its exposure to a potential award of attorney fees in the event of default. The decision is also
inconsistent with the literal language of the rule.” Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho at 198. The
prayer for relief in the complaint satisfied the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4), where it asked
for “the actual cost of attorney fees and Court costs.” Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho at 197.
At the time of Magleby decision, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) was worded differently the current
rule. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) at the time of the decision required a specific dollar amount in the prayer
for relief, which the rule currently does not require.
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I.R.C.P. 54(e) (4) provides that attorney fees “shall not be awarded unless the
prayer for relief in the complaint states that the party is seeking attorney fees and
the dollar amount thereof in the case judgment is entered by default.” It
continues, stating that any award in case of a default judgment “shall not exceed
the amount prayed for in the complaint. Any award of attorney fees pursuant to
I.C. Section 12–120, in default judgments in which the defendant has not
appeared shall not exceed the amount of the judgment for the claim, exclusive of
costs.”
Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho at 197 (emphasis added). The current language of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4)
does not have the language “the dollar amount thereof.”

It just specifies the amount of

attorneys fees.
In this case, the Graybills had notice that attorneys fees would be sought as part of the
judgment as Badger specified in its prayer for relief that it would seek its “attorneys fees and
costs incurred in this litigation pursuant to . . . Idaho Code § 45-513.” (R. Vol. I, p. 74). The
prayer for relief was sufficient to put the Graybills on notice if they contested Badger’s lien
claim, that they faced the award of attorneys fees and costs as set forth in the complaint. That is
sufficient for the rule pursuant to the holding of Magleby.
In this case, the Graybills appeared and actively defended the lawsuit prior to the
eventual entry of the default judgment. As set forth above, the Graybills appeared through its
counsel on June 8, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 61). Badger filed a Motion for Default against the
Graybills on July 27, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 114). The District Court entered an Order of Default
against the Graybills on July 28, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 122-23). The District Court scheduled a
case scheduling conference for August 23, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 9).
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On August 15, 2017, Badger filed its Motion for Default Judgment against the Graybills
and their property, and scheduled the hearing to take place on the same day as the scheduling
conference, August 23, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 9, 125). On August 21, 2017, the Graybills filed a
detailed Motion to Disallow the Plaintiff’s Motion, Affidavit, and Proposed Default. (R. Vol. I,
p. 196-201).
The Graybills defended against the substantive issues in the case including:
1.

The Graybills objected that their mailing address was not 240 Hanford Drive,

Sagle, Idaho 83860, nor is Graybills’ mailing address 4683 E. Hudlow Road, Hayden, Idaho,
83835. The Graybill appeared to contest whether there had been notice of the mechanic’s lien
had apparently been mailed to the correct mailing address.
2.

The Graybills argued that Badger was seeking a judgment against the Graybills

personally, rather than just against the Graybills’ property. (R. Vol. I, p. 196-97).
The Graybills further argued various procedural issues in its Motion, including:
1.

The Graybills contended that Badger’s prayer for relief in the complaint

improperly asked the court to order the sheriff to execute a deed to the purchaser at a sheriff’s
sale of the Graybill’s Property, since that cannot be done until the right of redemption has
passed.
2.

The Graybills contended that there was no specific request in the prayer for relief

in the complaint for interest.
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3.

The Graybills contended that there was no specific dollar amount pled by Badger

in its complaint that for the costs for recording, the title report. I.R.C.P. 54(d). The Graybills
also argue that the certain costs should not be awarded to Badger since they are not specifically
allowed by a statute.
4.

The Graybills argued that a specific dollar amount for attorneys fees had not been

pled for I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4).
5.

The Graybills objected to the interest rate.

6.

The Graybills argued that Badger needed to file a Memorandum of Costs for the

Graybills to then object, apparently relying upon I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4). (R. Vol. I, p. 197-201).
Upon receiving Graybills’ extensive Motion, Badger voluntarily struck the hearing for
the Default Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 9). The parties proceeded to have the scheduling conference
on August 23, 2017, which the Graybills’ attorney attended. (R. Vol. I, p. 10).

The Court

scheduled a trial to take place in March 27, 2018. (R. Vol. I, p. 10).
Badger then filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint on September 6, 2017, to address
the Graybills’ litany of objections to the form of Badger’s Complaint. (R. Vol. II, p. 202-37).
The hearing date for the Motion to Amend was September 20, 2017. (R. Vol. II, p. 202-04).
Badger filed a detailed Memorandum and proposed Amended Complaint. (R. Vol. II, p. 20837).

Badger’s proposed Amended Complaint included a specific dollar amount for attorneys

fees in the event a default judgment is entered in order to address the Graybills’ argument that a
dollar amount needed to be specified in the complaint in the event a default judgment was
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entered pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4). (R. Vol. II, p. 232). It further dealt with and addressed a
number of other arguments made by the Graybills.
The Graybills’ counsel appeared at this hearing on September 20, 2017, and again argued
at length against Badger’s Motion to Amend. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 36-43). The Graybills’ counsel
argued that the Graybills had filed a Notice of Tender of Funds on August 21, 2017, and that
somehow that precluded an award of attorneys fees, and somehow constituted res judicata. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 38, L. 8-25, p. 39, L. 1-7, R. Vol. 1, p. 9). The Graybills continued to argue about
whether it was a personal judgment versus a judgment against the Graybill’s property. (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 39, L. 8-10). They argued at length against the amendment of the complaint because there
had been an order of default, and that it cannot be amended after an order of default is entered.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 1-11). This is despite the fact that Badger agreed to stipulate to vacating the
order of default if that was the obstacle. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 44, L. 11-25). The Graybills continued
argue at length that there could not be an award of attorneys fees since there was a precise dollar
figure specified in the complaint. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 12-25, p. 38, L. 1-25).
During the September 20, 2017, the District Court denied the Badger’s Motion to Amend
the Complaint. The District Court reasoned that there was no need to amend the complaint to
specify a dollar figure in the event of a default, because the complaint specified that Badger was
seeking an award of attorneys fees and costs for having to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien
against the Graybill’s property. The District Court reasoned that the Graybills had notice that
attorneys fees would be sought as part of the judgment. (Tr. Vol I, p. 42, L. 22-25, p. 43, L. 1-
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14). Since the Graybills had notice that Badger would be seeking its attorneys fees and costs, it
would serve no basis to amend the complaint to specify a dollar amount as it would just require
unnecessary additional attorneys fees. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45, L. 22-25, p. 46, L. 1-13).
On September 21, 2017, the Graybills filed a detailed pleading entitled “Graybills’
Memorandum on Issue of An Award of Attorney Fees on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Default
Judgment.” (R. Vol. II, p. 241-45). The Graybills again argued at length the objections raised
during the hearing about how Badger no longer had a mechanic’s lien because the Graybills had
“paid” the debt owed by the mechanic’s lien through an attempted tender of funds that Badger
returned to the Grabyills. (R. Vol. II, p. 242). The Graybills argued at length about their defense
to an award of attorneys fees since they argued that Badger needed to specify a dollar amount in
the prayer for relief in the event of a default pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4). (R. Vol. II, p. 24245).
On September 29, 2017, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in
which the District Court denied Badger’s Motion to Amend the Complaint, and Denied
Graybills’ Motion to Disallow an award of attorneys fees and costs to Badger. (R. Vol. II, p.
246-59).
On October 3, 2017, Badger filed its Motion for Default Judgment pleadings, including
an affidavit for attorneys fees and the Memorandum of Costs. (R. Vol. II, p. 261-360). The
hearing for the Motion for Default Judgment was scheduled to take place on October 18, 2017.
On October 16, 2017, the Graybills again filed a detailed pleading entitled “Graybills’ Objection
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and Motion to Disallow Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Default Judgment.” (R. Vol. II, p. 361386). In this lengthy Memorandum, the Graybills’ continued to defend against any award of
attorneys fees, and argued at length regarding the District Court’s analysis in the September 29,
2017 Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. Vol. II, p. 361-386).
The Court should affirm the District Court’s award of attorneys fees based upon the
holding of Magleby, because the Graybills actively defended this case.

As explained by the

Court in Magleby, the Graybills had notice if they contested the claim, that they faced the award
of attorneys fees and costs as set forth in the complaint. Badger did not need to quantify a
specific dollar amount because Badger did specify that it would be an amount to proven at the
time of trial. As explained by the Court in Magleby, in a case such as this one where the
Graybills appeared and actively defended the case, only later to have a default judgment entered,
at the time Badger filed the complaint it could not meaningfully assign a number to the requested
attorneys fees to be entered at the event of the default. The “amount of reasonable attorney fees
is necessarily dependent upon future, unknown events, i.e., the extent to which additional
services by plaintiff's counsel are required to respond to the defense of the lawsuit.” Magleby,
154 Idaho at 197. Since the Graybills appeared and actively defended, Badger was not required
to forecast the amount of attorneys fees in the event of a default judgment. The Court should
therefore affirm the District Court on this basis.
C.

The Court Should Affirm the Court’s Decision Based Upon the Fact any Procedural
Issues Could Have Been Addressed by the Motion to Amend the Complaint.
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The Court should alternatively affirm the District Court’s award of attorneys fees because
the Graybills’ technical defense to the award of attorneys fees could have been addressed had the
District Court granted Badger’s Motion to Amend the Complaint.
“When a judgment on appeal reaches the correct conclusion, but employs reasoning
contrary to that of this Court, we may affirm the judgment on alternate grounds.” Kosmann v.
Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363, 366, 386 P.3d 504, 507 (Idaho, 2016). Badger is not seeking a
modification of the judgment entered by the Court or the relief granted by the Court, and thus it
is appropriate for the Court to affirm on this alternative basis. I.A.R. 11(g) provides:
(g) Cross-appeals and Additional Issues on Appeal. After an appeal has been
filed from a judgment or order specified above in this rule, a timely cross-appeal
may be filed from any interlocutory or final judgment, order or decree. If no
affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the
judgment, order or decree, an issue may be presented by the respondent as an
additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal.
Courts have interpreted this rule to not require a cross-appeal when the respondent is seeking to
affirm the district court’s judgment on an alternative basis.
A cross-appeal is required only when the respondent seeks to change or add to the
relief afforded below, but not when it merely seeks to sustain a judgment for
reasons presented at trial which were not relied upon by the trial judge but should
have been. Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107 Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038
(1985), (Huntley, J., concurring); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414
F.2d 724 (9th Cir.1969).
Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993, 739 P.2d 290, 292 (Idaho, 1987) (citing I.A.R.
11(f), which is now I.A.R. 11(g)).
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For the reasons set forth above, the District Court was correct to award Badger its
attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-513. The Court should affirm the District
Court’s award of attorneys fees because Graybills’ technical defense regarding the award could
have been addressed had the District Court granted Badger’s Motion to Amend the Complaint
that it promptly filed in the case. (R. Vol. II, p. 202-237). Badger proposed to amend the
complaint to provide a specific dollar amount for the attorneys fees and costs in the event a
default judgment was entered against the Graybills. (R. Vol. II, p. 232). This was early in the
case, and leave to amend is freely granted by the Court.

There was further no prejudice to the

Graybills.
Badger cited to the case of Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57, 58, 665 P.2d 1067, 1068
(1983), where an order of default had been entered, and where there was a subsequent motion to
amend the complaint afterwards to increase the attorneys fees being sought. While the case was
reversed on a different ground, the court did not indicate in the opinion that the post-default
amendment was improper. Neither the Graybills, nor the District Court, cited to any court rule
or other legal authority that prevented the amendment after a default order had been entered. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 35 L. 1-16,).
The District Court disagreed that there was any requirement to specify an amount of
attorneys fees in the complaint under the Court Rule, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4). The District Court
further commented that a default order had been entered against the Graybills, and that the
District Court did not believe it was appropriate to amend the complaint after the default order
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had been entered. The District Court believed it would result in unnecessary additional attorneys
fees and costs. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45, L. 22-25, p. 46, L. 1-13).
The Graybills’ counsel took the opportunity to seize upon the District Court’s comments
about the order of default being entered, and argued at length how it was somehow inappropriate
to allow an amendment to address the attorney fee issue complaint. This is despite the fact that
the Graybills were filing multiple pleadings and actively defending the case after the Court had
entered to the order of default. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37 L. 1-11,).
Badger agreed to stipulate to an order vacating the order of default if necessary. (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 44 L. 1-25,). The District Court is free to set aside an entry of default for good cause,
I.R.C.P. 55(c). Badger’s consent to set aside the entry of default to address the Graybills
procedural argument regarding an award of attorneys fees on the entry of default judgment was
good cause to set aside the default if the Court that was necessary to do.
Had the District Court allowed the Motion to Amend the Complaint, there would have
been no basis for the Graybills’ argument about an award of attorneys fee upon the entry of the
default judgment. This is an alternative basis for the Court to affirm the District Court’s award
of attorneys fees.
1.

Leave to Amend a Complaint is Freely Given by the Court.

I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2) provides that a party may amend its complaint by the court’s leave, and
that the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” I.R.C.P. 15(c)(1)(B) provides
that an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when “the
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amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out, or attempted to be set out in the original pleading.”
“A court should liberally grant a motion to amend a complaint.” Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v.
Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003). In this case, the
proposed Second Amended Complaint merely clarified the claims being asserted against the
Graybills. There are not new claims being alleged, nor new parties being added to the lawsuit.
Idaho Courts which have addressed this situation where a complaint is being amended to
simply clarify the claims, and where no new claims are being added, and where no new parties
are being added, have held that the Court should grant leave to amend the complaint unless the
noticed party would be unduly prejudiced thereby in maintaining its defense.
Under Rule 15(c) the amended pleading must be examined to determine whether
the new claims “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set **1080
*1017 forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” We believe the
district court took a hypertechnical view of the rule when it concluded that the
amended complaint was not sufficiently related to the original complaint.
Underlying Rule 15(c) and its relation-back provisions is the concept that a party
should be given notice of the allegations against him. 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1497–1498 at 489–
516 (1971). Therefore, if a party is put on notice by the original complaint, an
amendment to cure a defective pleading should not be prohibited unless the
noticed party would be unduly prejudiced in maintaining its defense. One of
the purposes of Rule 15 is to allow amendments to expand or cure defective
pleadings. Id. It is well settled that, in the interest of justice, courts should
favor liberal grants of leave to amend. Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111
Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986); Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 326
P.2d 994 (1958); C. LEWIS, IDAHO PRE–TRIAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, V–1 to
–2 (1982).
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Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1016–17, 729 P.2d 1075, 1079–80 (Ct. App. 1986),
dismissed (Apr. 30, 1987)(emphasis added).
The Court in Herrera looked at the following factors to determine if there was prejudice
to the defendants by the amendment.
But while amendments are to be freely granted, the district court must also
consider whether the nonamending party would be prejudiced as a result of the
amendments. See, e.g., Ladd v. Coats, supra. For instance, courts should closely
examine amendments sought immediately prior to trial, after substantial pretrial
work has been completed, to determine the extent of any prejudice that would be
suffered by the opposing party if the amendment were granted. Application of the
relation-back provisions of 15(c) should not be governed solely by whether the
amendment avoids statute of limitation problems. Rather the focus should be upon
whether the nonamending party has notice of a claim against it within the
limitation of action period and whether the nonamending party would be
prejudiced by any changes in the pleadings.
Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho at 1016–17.
In this case, there was no prejudice to the Graybills. The District Court had just had the
scheduling conference on August 23, 2017, for a trial date scheduled to occur in March 27, 2018.
(R. Vol. I, p. 9-10). Badger filed its Motion to Amend on September 6, 2017, and the hearing
took place on September 20, 2017. (R. Vol. II, p. 206-37).

The deadline to file a motion to

amend the pleadings according to the Court’s Order Setting Trial and Pretrial Order was not until
November 21, 2017. (R. Vol. II, p. 215). There had not been substantial pretrial work. The
Graybills certainly had notice of the claims and they were not prejudiced by any change in the
pleadings. The proposed Second Amended Complaint simply addresses the technical arguments
raised by the Graybills in their object to Badger’s Motion for Default Judgment.
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2.

Idaho Courts Have Allowed a Motion to Amend After an Order of Default
Has Been Entered against a Defendant.

There is no prohibition to amending a complaint after an order of default has been
entered. This issue was addressed in the case of Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho at 58, 665 P.2d at
1068. In that case, the plaintiffs moved to enter defendants' default on the ground that they had
failed to enter an appearance or substitute attorneys within the time required. Although a default
order on that ground was entered, default judgment was not taken. The plaintiffs thereafter
sought and received permission of the judge to file and serve an amended complaint on
defendants. The amended complaint prayed for an additional $1,200.00 in attorney fees if the
action went by default. The defendants were served with a copy of the complaint.

The

defendants failed to answer the complaint within twenty days, and the plaintiffs moved for a
default judgment, on the grounds that service had been completed and the defendant had failed,
refused, and neglected to appear or plead to said complaint within the time required by law.
Judgment was entered on the default. Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho at 58. The default judgment
was reversed on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not provide the defendants with the three-day
notice before obtaining the original order of default.

Nevertheless, there was nothing in that

opinion that precluded the amendment of the complaint after the original default order was
entered. The District Court should have likewise allowed Badger leave to amend its complaint to
plead a specific dollar amount for an award of attorneys fees when the default judgment was
entered.

This would have addressed the Graybills’ technical argument, and it is an alternative

basis as why the District Court’s attorney fee award should be affirmed.
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D.

Badger Should Be Awarded its Attorneys Fees on Appeal.
The Graybills have filed an appeal of the District Court’s modest award of attorneys fees

and costs of $8,134.62, that was based upon I.C. 45-513. The Graybills did this even though it is
well recognized by the Courts that attorneys fees and costs cannot be awarded on appeal
pursuant to I.C. 45-513. Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho 72, 79, 982 P.2d 375, 382 (Idaho
App.,1999)(citing Hendrix v. Gold Ridge Mines, Inc., 56 Idaho 326, 54 P.2d 254 (1936) which
held that Idaho legislature evidenced intent to limit available attorney fees to those incurred in
the district court by adopting the general language of a California lien statute, but deleting that
portion of the statute which had specifically authorized attorney fees for action in appellate
courts.)
There are three different bases for the Court to affirm the District Court’s award of
attorneys fees and costs to Badger, which the Graybills knew full well before they pursued this
appeal. The Graybills have relentlessly argued a very technical defense for attorneys fees which
are clearly owed under the lien statute pursuant to I.C. 45-513. The Graybills have needlessly
increased the cost by pursuing this defense which is contrary to the statute, the very purpose of
the default judgment rule, and which could have easily been addressed through an amendment of
the complaint, which the Defendants vehemently fought. Given the issues involved, the Court
should award attorneys fees and costs to Badger pursuant to I.C. 12-121, because the Graybills
brought this appeal unreasonably and without foundation. Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho at 79.
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The Graybills argue for an award of attorneys fees under I.C. 12-121 in the event that
Badger responded to their appeal to affirm the District Court’s well reasoned judgment. There is
certainly no basis for an award of attorneys fees to the Graybills under that statute, and the Court
should deny the Graybills’ request.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Badger respectfully requests that the Court affirm the District
Court’s Judgment, which included an award of attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Court §
45-513.
DATED this 17th day of October 2018.
STAMPER RUBENS, P.S.

/s/ Matthew T. Ries
MATTHEW T. RIES
Attorney for Respondent/Plaintiff Regdab, Inc.
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